Ambiguous MCQ Recruitment Exam Supreme Court: Supernumerary Post Relief for Fair Selection

Case Summary

• Case Name: Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 3446 of 2026 arising out of SLP (C) No. 16533/2025)

• Date of Judgment: 17 March 2026

• Judges: Honourable Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra; Honourable Justice Sanjay Karol

• Constitutional Provisions/Acts/Sections: Article 31B of the Constitution of India; Ninth Schedule of the Constitution; Article 141 (binding effect of Supreme Court precedent); basic structure doctrine

• Cited Judgments: Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar (1951); Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965); C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967); His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala (1973); I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007); Vikas Pratap Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh (2013)

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s order dated 17 March 2026 in Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh arises from an apparently narrow factual matrix, an ambiguous multiple choice question (MCQ) asked in a recruitment examination for the post of Law Officer, but it engages issues of constitutional jurisprudence, the evolution of the Ninth Schedule jurisprudence, administrative fairness in recruitment, and equitable remedies in service litigation. The judgment is notable for its pragmatic resolution: rather than deciding the constitutional point in a way that would oust either candidate, the Court accommodated both by directing the creation of a supernumerary post.

The Legal Backdrop and Question 73

The dispute concerned Question No. 73 in the examination, which asked which schedule of the Constitution is immune from judicial review on grounds of violation of fundamental rights: Seventh, Ninth, Tenth or None of the above. The recruiting authority marked the Ninth Schedule (option B) as correct; the candidate (Amit Kumar Sharma) chose None of the above (option D). The Single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld the recruiting body’s answer, applying a line of authorities that recognised, albeit subject to later refinement, the protective ambit of Article 31B. The Division Bench, however, held that the Ninth Schedule is not absolutely immune from judicial review and that option D could be correct in light of I.R. Coelho. The Supreme Court was faced with a conflict between two reasonable legal views taken by High Court Judges on a tightly framed MCQ answered by law graduates competing for a single post.

Key Holdings and the Pragmatic Approach

The Supreme Court recognised three core realities:

1. The constitutional jurisprudence on the Ninth Schedule has evolved and is not easily capturable in a simple MCQ for candidates; different decisions across decades reflect different formulations.

2. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench relied on authoritative precedents; the divergence in outcome reflected interpretative difficulty rather than manifest error.

3. The mechanical application of negative marking and immediate displacement of a selected candidate would produce an unfair result if the question itself called for legal interpretation that is unsettled or nuanced.

Accordingly, the Court directed that both candidates be accommodated by creating a supernumerary post and ordered that the appellant (already selected and in service) be treated as senior. The Court expressly relied upon Vikas Pratap Singh as authority for the creation of a supernumerary post in service related contests to balance equities.

Judicial Reasoning and Significant Observations

The judgment contains several lines that merit citation and reflection. Two excerpts that capture the tenor of the decision are:

When the Judges of the High Court are at variance in their opinion as to the correct answer to Question No. 73, it is least expected from mere law graduates, who are competing for a post of Law Officer, to reach to a correct conclusion while answering the multiple choice question by process of interpretation of Constitutional provisions involving this Court’s judgments in several decades.

From a law graduate’s point of view, both the answers may be correct, although Option B (Ninth Schedule) appears to be more appropriate considering the language of the question asked. However, on a deeper analysis ... Option D (None of the above) can also be considered to be correct.

These observations underline the Court’s pragmatic recognition that recruitment examinations are not the appropriate forum to ventilate evolving constitutional doctrines and that the selection process must be safeguarded against collateral damage arising from doctrinal uncertainty.

Critical Appraisal of the Supernumerary Remedy

The decision is defensible on several grounds. First, it respects competing rights: the selected candidate’s legitimate expectation and reliance on the appointment are preserved, while the aggrieved candidate’s right to fair consideration is vindicated. Second, it avoids an outcome that would thrust the Supreme Court into a protracted engagement with the merits of Ninth Schedule jurisprudence simply to determine an answer to a recruitment MCQ. Third, the remedy is proportionate and remedial without being punitive to the administration.

However, the pragmatic solution raises practical and normative questions. The creation of supernumerary posts as a routine solution may have resource implications and could incentivise litigation by candidates seeking similar relief where an ambiguous question adversely affects ranking. It also risks signalling to recruiting agencies that procedural sloppiness can be cured by post hoc accommodation rather than by improving question setting rigour. The judgment therefore carries an implicit admonition: administrative authorities must avoid drafting exam questions on unsettled legal propositions or, if necessary, must frame questions with temporal or doctrinal qualifiers (for example, According to I.R. Coelho or As held in Kesavananda Bharati).

Reforms for Recruitment and Exam Framing

This judgment should prompt immediate and practical reforms in recruitment examinations for legally qualified posts:

• Avoid complex interpretation: Avoid MCQs that require contestable constitutional interpretation. If such topics are unavoidable, the question should specify the legal position under a particular authoritative ruling or indicate a cut off date.

• Establish vetting committees: Establish pre publication vetting committees comprising constitutional scholars and practising judges to vet law related questions for ambiguity.

• Rectification mechanisms: Provide a clear mechanism for post exam review and rapid rectification (re evaluation, corrigenda) where ambiguity is identified.

• Reconsider negative marking: Reconsider negative marking for questions that test interpretative skills rather than orthodox knowledge; negative marking is particularly unforgiving where an answer turns on reasonable, competing judicial interpretations.

Wider Jurisprudential Context

The judgment implicitly reiterates the status of I.R. Coelho as having tempered any absolute immunity of Ninth Schedule laws by reference to the basic structure test, while also recognising the long line of precedents that once conferred broader protection. The Court’s reluctance to authoritatively pronounce on the debate in this case is prudent: the particular factual context did not require an expansive constitutional pronouncement and the practical remedy achieved a fair outcome.

Conclusion and Practical Takeaways

Charan Preet Singh is a salutary decision for practitioners and administrative authorities alike. For courts, it is an example of pragmatic equity, balancing competing rights without unnecessary doctrinal expansion. For recruitment bodies, it is a warning: questions that engage unsettled constitutional law can create avoidable litigation and may justify equitable remedies that the organisation will be ordered to implement. For litigants, it confirms that courts may fashion pragmatic remedies (including supernumerary posts) to reconcile competing equities borne of procedural or substantive ambiguity.

In short, the decision underscores a simple lesson for legal recruitment: clarity in question framing is not cosmetic; it is essential to the integrity of selection processes. As the Court put it, succinctly and trenchantly, both the candidates deserve to be accommodated. That pragmatic ethos, protecting both expectation and fairness, is the principal merit of the ruling.

FAQs

Q1. What is the current legal status of the Ninth Schedule's immunity from judicial review?

While Article 31B was originally intended to create a "safe harbor" for laws within the Ninth Schedule, the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in I.R. Coelho (2007) established that this immunity is no longer absolute. Any law added to the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgment), can be challenged if it violates the "Basic Structure" of the Constitution or fundamental rights.

Q2. Why did the Supreme Court order the creation of a "supernumerary post" in this case?

The Court utilized the "supernumerary post" as an equitable remedy to balance the rights of two competing candidates. Because the exam question was legally ambiguous and both candidates had "correct" interpretations based on different eras of judicial precedent, the Court decided that neither should be penalized. Creating an extra, temporary post allowed the selected candidate to keep his job while ensuring the aggrieved candidate also received an appointment.

Q3. What does this judgment suggest about the use of complex legal theories in recruitment exams?

The judgment serves as a warning to recruitment bodies to avoid using Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs) for unsettled or highly nuanced legal doctrines. The Court noted that even High Court judges were at variance regarding the "correct" answer, making it unreasonable to expect law graduates to reach a definitive conclusion under exam pressure. It suggests that exams should focus on settled law or provide specific doctrinal context within the question.

Q4. How does the "Basic Structure Doctrine" apply to Question No. 73 in the Law Officer exam?

The Basic Structure Doctrine is the reason why "None of the above" was considered a valid answer. Since judicial review is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution, no schedule including the Ninth can be entirely immune from it. The recruiting authority's insistence on the Ninth Schedule as being "immune" was based on an older, narrower interpretation of Article 31B that has since been refined by the Court.