High Court Regularisation of Ad-hoc Staff — Ratnank Mishra v. Allahabad High Court

Case Summary

• Case name: Ratnank Mishra & Ors. v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad through Registrar General(Civil Appeal Nos. 428–431 of 2022)

• Date of judgment: 19 December 2025

• Bench:

  • Hon’ble Justice J.K. Maheshwari

  • Hon’ble Justice Vijay Bishnoi

• Counsel:

  • For the Appellants: Mr P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel

  • For the Respondent: Ms Preetika Dwivedi, learned Counsel

• Statutory / Constitutional Provisions Invoked:

  • Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976

    • Rules 8(a)(i), 32, 33, 40(2), 41, 45

  • U.P. Regularization of Ad-hoc Appointments Rules, 1979

  • Articles 229, 14, 16, 21 and 142 of the Constitution of India

• Cited Authorities:

  • State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1

  • Division Bench, High Court of Allahabad, Special Appeal No. 563 of 2008 (judgment dated 20.09.2011)

  • Full Bench, In Re: Regularization of Class IV Employees of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (18.09.2013)

I. Introduction and Factual Core

This appeal examines whether a High Court’s administrative machinery—acting through a Committee and the Registrar—can lawfully treat identically appointed Class III staff differently for the purpose of regularisation.

The appellants were engaged as Operator-cum-Data Entry Assistants / Routine Grade Clerks by orders of the Chief Justice under the express residuary powers contained in the 1976 Rules, notably Rules 8(a)(i), 41 and 45. Certain persons appointed through the same channel were regularised pursuant to a Committee report dated May 2012. The appellants, however, were excluded and later discontinued.

The grievance was straightforward but serious: similarly situated employees were granted regularisation, while the appellants were denied parity without any reasonable classification.

II. Legal Issues and the Statutory Matrix

The judgment is structured around two interconnected legal questions:

1. Scope and limits of administrative discretion vested in the Chief Justice under the 1976 Rules; and

2. Constitutional prohibition against arbitrariness and unequal treatment, particularly under Article 14, read with Articles 16 and 21.

Rule 8(a)(i) permits recruitment “in any manner as the Chief Justice may direct”, while Rules 41 and 45 preserve residuary powers. Where no internal High Court rules exist governing regularisation, Rule 40(2) mandates adoption of applicable State rules—here, the U.P. Regularization Rules, 1979, including their cut-off date.

III. Reasoning of the Court

The Court undertook a close factual comparison. The Committee had divided employees into three categories—A, B and C:

• Category A: Employees with examination stipulations (later rendered otiose by the Division Bench judgment dated 20.09.2011) or treated as probationers under Rules 32–33.

• Category B: Employees appointed under Rule 45, not labelled as ad hoc.

• Category C: Employees described as ad hoc and appointed after the 1979 cut-off date, including the present appellants.

The High Court justified differential treatment on these distinctions. The Supreme Court rejected this approach.

The Court laid down a decisive proposition:

Where the channel of appointment and the nature of work are identical, superficial distinctions in appointment letters—such as the label “ad-hoc” or incidental stipulations—cannot justify adverse differential treatment.

Reaffirming the core principle under Article 14, the Court observed:

“Equals must be treated equally and persons similarly circumstanced should not be treated differently without a rational and intelligible differentia.”

It concluded that the Committee’s classification resulted in manifest arbitrariness, causing “grave prejudice” to the appellants.

IV. Remedial Relief and Invocation of Article 142

While acknowledging that regularisation is ordinarily a matter of administrative policy, the Court found the present case to be exceptional. Exercising its plenary powers under Article 142, it granted final relief, directing:

• Reinstatement of the appellants

• Regularisation after one year from their respective dates of appointment

• Grant of consequential benefits, including:

  • Seniority

  • Promotion

  • Pay fixation and increments

  • Retiral benefits

No wages were awarded for periods during which the appellants had not worked. Compliance was directed within eight weeks.

Importantly, the Court expressly confined the relief to the facts of the case and disclaimed any general precedent value.

V. Critical Observations and Practical Takeaways

1. Substance over form

Administrative labels such as “ad-hoc” cannot be used as a smokescreen to deny parity where the recruitment channel and duties are identical. Practitioners should focus on functional and procedural sameness, not merely the language of appointment orders.

2. Discretion is reviewable

Although the Chief Justice enjoys wide discretion under the 1976 Rules, such discretion must conform to constitutional standards of reasonableness and equality. Arbitrary classification invites judicial correction.

3. Article 142 as a corrective tool

The judgment illustrates that Article 142 remains available to craft complete and effective relief where prolonged injustice is evident—though its use is carefully circumscribed.

4. Institutional and constitutional limits

The Court noted Article 229 constraints, particularly the requirement of Governor’s approval where service conditions affecting salary or pension are altered. Regularisation exercises must therefore respect constitutional architecture.

5. Guidance for employers and courts

Public employers, including constitutional courts, should:

• Frame clear and published regularisation criteria

• Record transparent reasons for differential treatment

• Ensure parity where appointment channels and functions are identical

VI. Concluding Observations

This judgment holds continuing relevance for disputes involving regularisation of ad-hoc appointees across public institutions. It firmly reiterates that constitutional equality cannot be defeated by artificial administrative classifications, especially where appointments are made through the same statutory route and employees discharge identical functions.

As the Court aptly noted:

“High Courts, being Constitutional Courts entrusted to uphold equality and fairness, are expected to encompass such principles within their own administrative functioning as well, and must exemplify the standards of a model employer.”

For litigators and administrators alike, the decision serves as a reminder that reasoned, consistent, and documentable processes are indispensable when managing public employment.