It Would Be a Travesty of Justice: Supreme Court on Limits of Suspending Sentence in POCSO Convictions

Summary of the Judgment

• Case Name: Lilaben v. State of Gujarat & Anr.

• Citation: 2025 INSC 519

• Court: Supreme Court of India, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction

• Date of Judgment: 21st April, 2025

• Coram: Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra

• Appellant Counsel: Ms. Shahrukh Alam and Ms. Swati Ghidiyal

• Respondent No.2 Counsel: Mr. Varinder Kumar Sharma

• Applicable Acts & Sections:

  • Indian Penal Code, 1860: Sections 363, 366(A), 376(3)

  • Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012: Section 6

  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 235, 389

  • Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015: Section 94

• Cited Judgments:

  • Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 842

  • K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, (2005) 1 SCC 754

  • State of Haryana v. Hasmat, (2004) 6 SCC 175

  • Vijay Kumar v. Narendra, (2002) 9 SCC 364

  • Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal, (2002) 9 SCC 366

  • Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 291

  • Afzal Ansari v. State of U.P., (2024) 2 SCC 187

  • Angana v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 3 SCC 767

Introduction

The Supreme Court in Lilaben v. State of Gujarat & Anr. revisited the interpretative boundaries of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, with a sharpened focus on judicial prudence, societal interest, and the gravity of offences involving child victims. The judgment carries significant implications for how courts may approach applications for suspension of sentence in cases involving convictions under the POCSO Act.

Background of the Case

The appeal was filed by the mother of a minor who was sexually assaulted, challenging the suspension of sentence granted by the Gujarat High Court to the convict, Respondent No. 2. He had been convicted under Sections 363, 366(A), 376(3) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The trial court had sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment of up to 20 years.

The High Court had suspended the sentence during the pendency of the criminal appeal, primarily on the grounds that the age of the victim was “in doubt.” However, the Supreme Court found this reasoning to be unsustainable, especially when such findings impinge upon the credibility of a valid trial court verdict.

Judicial Discretion under Section 389 CrPC: A Limited Remedy

The Court placed its central analytical emphasis on the correct application of Section 389 CrPC. Quoting the statutory text and case law, the Hon’ble Bench reiterated:

“When an accused person applies to the Appellate Court for suspension of sentence and succeeds... what gets stayed is only the execution of the sentence and nothing more.”

Referring to K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, the Court reminded that the power to suspend a sentence must be exercised with circumspection, and always with recorded reasons based on a fair appreciation of the trial court’s findings.

Findings on Age Determination: A Question of Jurisdiction

A pivotal point in the High Court’s reasoning was the purported unreliability of the victim’s age, relying on documentary evidence produced by a Panchayat official lacking personal knowledge. However, the Supreme Court made it clear that questioning such factual determinations is not within the purview of powers exercised under Section 389 CrPC. That jurisdiction belongs to appellate courts under Section 374 CrPC, post full evaluation of the evidence on record.

The Court noted:

“Casting doubt upon a finding returned by the Court below, when the same isn’t within immediate purview, cannot be justified.”

Until the High Court adjudicates the appeal on merits and reverses the trial court’s conclusion, the victim must be presumed to have been a minor, and the convict’s actions treated accordingly.

Suspension of Sentence in Heinous Offences: The Rule or the Exception?

The Supreme Court reiterated its earlier position in Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P.—that suspension of sentence is an exception and not the rule. In particular, for offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding ten years or life imprisonment, public prosecutors must be given the opportunity to oppose such suspension, reinforcing the procedural checks laid out in the first proviso to Section 389(1) CrPC.

The case of Kashmira Singh was also discussed to acknowledge that delays in hearing appeals cannot justify indefinite incarceration:

“It would indeed be a travesty of justice to keep a person in jail for a period of five or six years for an offence which is ultimately found not to have been committed by him.”

Yet, this principle must be weighed against the gravity of offences and the interests of justice. The Court clearly cautioned against prioritising procedural delay over public safety in POCSO-related convictions.

Public Interest and Victim Rights: A Balancing Act

A nuanced dimension of the judgment lies in its attention to legitimate public aspirations. Quoting from Afzal Ansari v. State of U.P., the Court acknowledged that courts must strike a balance between the rights of the accused and the need to preserve societal trust in the criminal justice system.

“Societal interest is an equally important factor which ought to be zealously protected and preserved by the courts.”

In the case at hand, the Court observed that the gravity of the offence—sexual assault of a minor—warranted greater weight being placed on the community’s demand for accountability.

Conclusion and Directions

Setting aside the High Court’s order suspending the sentence, the Supreme Court directed the convict to surrender forthwith. Importantly, it allowed liberty to reapply for bail if the appeal was not disposed of within 18 months—thus reaffirming procedural fairness without compromising on justice to victims.

The Court concluded:

“The judicious use of this power [under Section 389 CrPC] being the path to be adopted by the Courts… does not justify the conclusion arrived at by the High Court.”

Implication

This judgment reasserts the limited and cautious exercise of appellate discretion in suspending sentences, particularly in sensitive cases under the POCSO Act. Legal professionals must take heed of the following:

• Merits Review v. Procedural Discretion: Merits of conviction are not to be second-guessed under Section 389. This distinction is vital when opposing or supporting suspension applications.

• Proof of Age in POCSO Cases: The judgment strengthens the credibility of documentary evidence under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act unless directly challenged during trial.

• Victim-Centric Justice: The balance of convenience must factor in not only the rights of the accused but also the psychological and societal dimensions of crimes against children.

• Limitation of High Court Powers: Even when delays are anticipated in appeal hearings, suspension of sentence must pass a high threshold of justification.

Final Words

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Lilaben v. State of Gujarat & Anr. is a reaffirmation of constitutional and statutory commitments towards child protection, victim rights, and judicial restraint. It offers robust guidance to appellate courts, legal practitioners, and public prosecutors on how discretion under Section 389 CrPC ought to be employed—not merely as a procedural safety net, but as an instrument of justice that maintains faith in the rule of law.