Landlord Has to Look for Avenues of Income to Support His Family: Supreme Court Affirms Bona Fide Need in 73-Year Tenancy Dispute
- Chintan Shah
- Apr 25
- 4 min read
Summary of the Judgment
Case Name: Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) Thr. His LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) Thr. LRs. and Ors.
Date of Judgment: 24th April 2025
Court: Supreme Court of India, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Civil Appeal No.: 4275 of 2017
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. M. Sundresh and Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. V. Viswanathan
Advocates:
For the Appellant: Mr. Balbir Singh, Senior Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Anand Varma, Advocate
Statutes & Provisions Cited:
Section 21(1)(a) and Section 21(7), Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
Rule 16(2), Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972
Important Judgments Cited:
Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397
Dwarkaprasad v. Niranjan, (2003) 4 SCC 549
Mohd. Ayub v. Mukesh Chand, (2012) 2 SCC 155
Sushila v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Banda, (2003) 2 SCC 28
Nidhi v. Ram Kripal Sharma (D.), (2017) 5 SCC 640
Sheshambal (D.) v. Chelur Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 470
Introduction
The Supreme Court, in a long-awaited and fiercely contested matter regarding the occupation of a cinema hall in Allahabad, decisively ruled in favour of the landlord’s right to reclaim possession on grounds of bona fide requirement under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The case draws a curtain over a tenancy that outlived its original lease by over six decades.
This decision is not only a reaffirmation of the rights of landlords under the Act but also a reminder of the judiciary’s approach in balancing legislative protections for tenants with the legitimate needs of landlords.
Background: A Tenancy that Refused to End
The genesis of this dispute dates back to 1952 when the suit property, a cinema hall known as Mansarovar Palace, was leased for ten years. It was later purchased by Murlidhar Aggarwal in 1962. Despite the lease’s expiry, the tenant continued to occupy the premises, leading to protracted litigation beginning in 1965 under various iterations of tenancy law, including the now-repealed U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947.
Subsequent proceedings under the 1972 Act culminated in a favourable order from the Prescribed Authority in 1983, recognising the landlord’s bona fide need. However, that finding was overturned by the Appellate Authority and upheld by the High Court. The present appeal challenged that trajectory.
Core Legal Issue
The central question was whether the landlord had established a bona fide requirement for the property under Section 21(1)(a) of the 1972 Act, particularly in light of the tenant’s long-standing possession and his claim of greater hardship.
Findings of the Supreme Court
Hon’ble Justice K. V. Viswanathan, writing for the Bench, meticulously reviewed the record and decisively found the Prescribed Authority's findings to be both "elaborate" and "cogent".
“Whether we apply the bona fide need as on the date of the eviction petition or take into account the subsequent events, we find that the bona fide need of the appellant… is made out on both scenarios.”
The Court was particularly critical of the Appellate Authority’s reasoning, which it found to be speculative and not grounded in an objective reappreciation of evidence.
Interpretation of Comparative Hardship
In dealing with comparative hardship, a requirement under the proviso to Section 21(1)(a), the Court applied the test laid out in Mohd. Ayub v. Mukesh Chand:
“One of the circumstances to be seen… is whether the tenant has brought on record any material to indicate that at any time during the pendency of the long drawn-out litigation, he made any attempt to seek an alternative accommodation…”
Here, the tenant had not only failed to seek alternative accommodation but had also enjoyed occupation for 73 years—including 63 years beyond the original lease term. Such prolonged occupation, the Court reasoned, could not itself defeat a legitimate claim for possession.
Rule 16(2) and Legislative Intent
Rule 16(2) of the 1972 Rules, which requires scrutiny of the landlord’s existing business, was cited by the tenant to suggest that the landlord had other businesses and hence less justification for eviction.
The Court rejected this argument. It noted:
“Taking the case of the respondents at its highest… the parties in financial terms could be said to be equally poised.”
The tenant’s reliance on speculative or defunct businesses did not impress the Bench, nor did vague assertions about the viability of cinema operations in backward regions like Ghazipur.
On Succession and Continuing Need
A significant procedural challenge was raised by the respondent: that the appellant’s legal heirs should have initiated fresh proceedings under their own claim of need.
The Court invoked Section 21(7) in response:
“In the absence of any denial to the facts that Atul Kumar… is crippled and has no other source of income… the need of the appellant has been clearly established.”
The judgment aligns with the liberal interpretation of ‘need’ under Joginder Pal and Dwarkaprasad, emphasising that bona fide requirement includes family members and is not extinguished upon the landlord’s death.
Stitching the Legal Fabric
The Supreme Court stitched together precedent and statutory interpretation in a masterful way. It relied on prior decisions such as:
Sushila v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Banda – where availability of alternate accommodation for the tenant reduced the weight of long tenancy.
Nidhi v. Ram Kripal Sharma – affirming need of the landlady’s family despite her relocation.
Sheshambal v. Chelur Corporation – distinguished as the heirs in that case were not dependent or needy.
Final Orders
The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and granted the respondents time until 31st December 2025 to vacate the premises, conditional upon filing the usual undertaking and clearing dues within four weeks.
Conclusion
This judgment is a critical reaffirmation of the principle that while tenancy law must protect against arbitrary evictions, it cannot be used to fossilise possession at the cost of the landlord’s genuine hardship. The decision also reinforces the operational value of Section 21(7) and Rule 16 in weighing intergenerational claims of bona fide need.
In a system where tenancy disputes often span generations, Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan reminds us that justice delayed does not have to be justice denied—especially when legal heirs can demonstrably carry forward the flame of necessity.
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