Limitation Is Not Merely Procedural—It Shields Bona Fide Purchasers’: Supreme Court Quashes High Court Remand In 17-Year-Old Property Suit.
- Chintan Shah
- Apr 11
- 4 min read
Summary of the Judgment
Case Name: R. Nagaraj (Dead) Through LRs & Another v. Rajmani & Others
Judgment Date: 9 April 2025
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: Hon’ble Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Justice R. Mahadevan
Citation: 2025 INSC 478
Legal Representatives:
For the Appellants: Mr. V. Prakash, Sr. Adv. with Mr. V. Balaji
For the Respondents: Mr. R. Nedunchezhiyan and Mr. N. Nithyanand
Key Statutes & Provisions:
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100
Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 59, Section 3
Important Cases Cited:
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari
Surat Singh v. Siri Bhagwan
Mehboob-Ur-Rehman v. Ahsanul Ghani
Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta
N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy
Introduction
In a significant pronouncement delivered on 9 April 2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in R. Nagaraj (Dead) Through LRs & Another v. Rajmani & Others set aside a remand order passed by the Madras High Court and restored the trial court’s decision dismissing a civil suit as barred by limitation. The ruling has far-reaching implications on appellate procedure, particularly in interpreting Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908.
This case serves as a precedent on how courts must tread carefully when remanding matters and not bypass the mandate of deciding substantial questions of law where findings of lower courts are concurrent and thoroughly reasoned.
The Factual Matrix
The origins of the dispute lie in a suit for maintenance filed in 1965 (O.S. No. 851 of 1965) by the wife and daughter of Samiappan—members of a joint Hindu family. The suit was decreed, and properties were attached in execution proceedings. The ‘A’ schedule property was sold through court auction in 1970, and subsequent purchasers took possession lawfully.
In 1982, nearly 17 years later, the wife and daughters of Dasappa Gowdar—co-parceners of the same family—instituted O.S. No. 257 of 1982 seeking to set aside the 1965 decree and demanding partition of the suit properties. Their claim hinged on alleged lack of knowledge of earlier proceedings and accusations of fraud and collusion.
Trial and Appellate Court Findings
The trial court dismissed the 1982 suit, holding it was hopelessly barred by limitation. Article 59 of the Limitation Act requires actions to set aside a decree on grounds of fraud to be filed within three years from when the right to sue accrues.
The trial court observed:
“The relief which is sought for, to set aside the decree, is hit by limitation. It is not mentioned in the plaint when for the first time they knew about the decree. This suit has been filed about 17 years later. The plaintiffs have failed to prove that the suit was within the stipulated time.”
The First Appellate Court upheld this finding, stating that the plaintiffs “had slept over their rights” and had full awareness of the decree and execution proceedings.
The High Court’s Remand
In a surprising turn, the Madras High Court, while admitting a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, remanded the matter back to the trial court on the sole ground that no specific issue of limitation was framed.
It concluded:
“Both the Courts failed to frame any issue in respect of limitation, though both held that the suit is barred by limitation.”
Accordingly, the matter was sent back for fresh trial with a direction to frame an issue on limitation and decide the matter within six months.
Supreme Court’s Intervention
The Supreme Court decisively reversed the High Court’s remand order. The Hon’ble Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan observed:
“The High Court has failed to decide the substantial question of law framed at the time of admission and went on to decide only the additional question regarding limitation.”
The Apex Court underscored that Section 100 CPC confers jurisdiction to hear a second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved—and such a question must be precisely formulated and decided.
Procedure Is a Tool—Not a Trap
The Court addressed the procedural lacuna—lack of a specifically framed issue on limitation—head-on, affirming the principle that substance must prevail over form. Relying on Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar and Kailash v. Nanhku, the Court observed:
“Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of doing substantial justice. Procedural laws are meant to assist, not obstruct.”
It further held that since both parties led evidence on the limitation issue and were aware that it was in controversy, the absence of a specifically worded issue did not cause prejudice.
Key Observations on Limitation
One of the most notable aspects of this judgment is its treatment of limitation as both a procedural safeguard and a substantive legal bar. The Court clarified:
“Limitation is not merely procedural—it protects certainty in transactions and shields bona fide purchasers. In cases of gross delay, like seventeen years here, the bar is absolute.”
In this regard, the Supreme Court relied on N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, which emphasised that the law of limitation is based on public policy to discourage stale claims and ensure certainty in legal affairs.
The Court’s Verdict
Reiterating that the High Court cannot remand cases where there are concurrent findings of fact unless a substantial question of law justifies interference, the Supreme Court ruled:
“The High Court was not justified in remanding the matter to the trial Court for fresh trial solely with respect to the issue of limitation.”
The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the decrees of the trial and appellate courts, dismissing the suit as time-barred.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in R. Nagaraj v. Rajmani provides much-needed clarity on the limits of appellate powers under Section 100 CPC. It reminds the judiciary and litigants alike that remand cannot be used to circumvent well-reasoned and concurrent findings, especially when the legal bar of limitation is clearly established.
By elevating the primacy of judicial efficiency and enforcing the statute of limitation as a substantive check, the Court has fortified the jurisprudence around second appeals. Legal practitioners will find in this decision a valuable touchstone on how appellate courts should navigate the often delicate interplay of procedure, limitation, and justice.
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