Maternity Benefits for Adoptive Mothers: Supreme Court Strikes Down 3 Month Limit

Case Summary

• Case name: Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India & Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 960 of 2021 (reported 2026 INSC 246)

• Date of judgment: 17 March 2026

• Judges: Honourable Justice J.B. Pardiwala; Honourable Justice R. Mahadevan

• Counsel: Ms Bani Dikshit for the petitioner; Mr K.M. Nataraj, Additional Solicitor General, for the respondents

• Statutes and provisions considered: Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (amended); Code on Social Security, 2020 — Section 60(4) (pari materia of former Section 5(4) MB Act); Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; CARA Regulations, 2022; Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules (provisions on paternity leave)

• Primary issues: constitutional validity of the three month age limit in Section 60(4) restricting maternity benefit for adoptive mothers; compatibility with Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21

Constitutional Protection for Adoptive Mothers

This carefully reasoned Constitution Bench judgment, authored by Honourable Justice J.B. Pardiwala and concurred by Honourable Justice R. Mahadevan, addresses a contest between a purposive conception of maternity protection and a statutory bright line rule that restricts adoptive mothers’ entitlement to paid maternity benefit to cases where the adopted child is below three months of age. The Court’s analysis is salutary for practitioners: it fuses doctrinal rigour on Article 14 review with a child centred application of Article 21 and a strong emphasis on the practical operability of welfare statutes.

Legal Framework and Central Holding

The Court affirms two fundamental propositions. First, maternity protection is a basic human right that transcends narrow biological notions of motherhood and includes protection for adoptive and commissioning mothers. Second, the three month cap in Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 is constitutionally infirm insofar as it excludes adoptive mothers of children aged three months or above from the statutory 12 week maternity benefit. The remedy is declaratory and purposive: Section 60(4) is to be read down so that any woman who legally adopts a child, or a commissioning mother, is entitled to twelve weeks’ maternity benefit from the date the child is handed over.

Equality Analysis and Under Inclusiveness

The Court undertakes the orthodox two fold test for classification under Article 14: intelligible differentia and rational nexus with the statute’s object. It rightly situates the 2020 Code within social security jurisprudence and emphasises that the object of maternity benefit is to dignify motherhood, secure economic protection and facilitate child welfare and bonding. The difficulty with the impugned provision is threefold: (i) the distinction drawn by the three month threshold is arbitrary vis-à-vis that object; (ii) the classification is under inclusive because it excludes adoptive mothers who are materially similarly situated as to caregiving needs; and (iii) there is no persuasive legislative explanation in the parliamentary debates or otherwise that justifies the precise temporal cut off.

The Court’s reliance on established precedent — including the classic formulations in State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar and Ambica Mills about reasonable classification — is apposite. Equally significant is the Court’s comparative turn: the South African Constitutional Court’s approach in Werner Van Wyk and the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling in Topčić Rosenberg reinforce the international consensus that parental leave regimes must be sensitive to adoption and the child’s need for integration. As the judgment states, "The object of maternity benefit is not associated with the process of childbirth but with the process of motherhood." That democratic, purposive thrust underpins the invalidation of the age cap.

Article 21 and Reproductive Autonomy

A particularly useful strand of the judgment is its treatment of adoption as an expression of reproductive autonomy. Drawing on Suchita Srivastava, Puttaswamy and X2, the Court situates adoption within the ambit of decisional autonomy protected by Article 21. This approach dissolves sterile hierarchies between biological and non biological parenthood for the purpose of social security entitlements. The Court’s observation that "a woman takes birth the day a child comes into her life" is rhetorically striking and captures the constitutional sensibility that dignity, not gestation, must be the lodestar of protection.

Best Interests of the Child and Practical Operability

The judgment is marked by sustained attention to the best interests of the child — a principle deeply embedded in the JJ Act and CARA Regulations. The Court rightly emphasises that the post placement period is critical to integration and that the needs of older adopted children (and children with disabilities) may make parental presence equally, if not more, necessary. Practitioners will welcome the Court’s recognition that the administrative timeline for declaring a child legally free for adoption often exceeds three months; consequently, the statutory cap renders the benefit illusory in many real world cases. The workability doctrine is invoked correctly: welfare legislation must not be a paper promise; it must be practicable.

Limits and Considerations for Employers

The Court addresses respondent arguments that employers’ interests and creche provisions can offset the absence of maternity leave for older adopted children. It dismisses such defences: crèche obligations attach only in larger establishments and do not substitute for uninterrupted parental presence; nor do they respond to the psycho social needs of bonding. The judgment leaves the legislature room to fashion calibrated schemes (for example, graded entitlement) but imposes a constitutional baseline — entitlement cannot be denied categorically on a three month rule.

Paternity Leave and Systemic Reform

Notably, the Bench closes by exhorting the Union to legislate on paternity leave. The judgment recognises that gendered distribution of care work is normative and that paternity leave is integral to dismantling the Wollstonecraft dilemma described in the judgment. For labour and employment practitioners, this is not merely aspirational: it signals judicial expectation that the statutory architecture for social security must evolve to recognise shared caregiving.

Practical Implications for Litigation and Policy

For litigators, the decision provides a robust template: challenge under inclusive welfare classifications by coupling Article 14 scrutiny with evidence on administrative timelines and child development research. For policymakers, the judgment is a clarion call to harmonise adoption procedure timelines with social security regimes and to consider gender neutral parental leave provisions that advance both equality and child welfare.

Conclusion

This is a significant, well argued decision that re anchors maternity benefit in dignity, equality and the child’s best interest. It reiterates that social security laws must be purposive, workable and child sensitive. The judgment will be of central relevance to employment law practitioners, public policy drafters and child welfare advocates. As the Court puts it, in a passage worth quoting, "When family structures and modes of parenthood have evolved and diversified, parenthood is not confined to the biological act of giving birth." The decision is therefore a timely constitutional correction that aligns statutory welfare with contemporary realities of family and caregiving.

FAQs

Q1. What was the constitutional flaw identified in Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020?

The Supreme Court found that the three month age limit for adopted children was arbitrary and violated Article 14 (Right to Equality). The Court ruled that the age of the child at the time of adoption does not change the adoptive mother's need for bonding and caregiving. By restricting benefits only to those adopting infants under three months, the law created an "under-inclusive" classification that left out a significant number of adoptive mothers who are in a functionally identical position.

Q2. How does the "Right to Reproductive Autonomy" under Article 21 apply to adoption?

The judgment expands the scope of Article 21 to include adoption as a protected expression of reproductive autonomy. Drawing on precedents like Puttaswamy, the Court held that the choice to become a parent through adoption is a deeply personal, decisional autonomy. Therefore, the state cannot discriminate against non-biological forms of parenthood when providing social security benefits, as dignity in motherhood is not tied to the biological act of gestation.

Q3. Why did the Court reject the argument that crèche facilities are a sufficient substitute for maternity leave?

The Court clarified that crèche provisions and maternity leave serve different purposes. While a crèche assists with childcare during working hours, it cannot replace the "uninterrupted parental presence" required for psycho-social bonding, especially during the initial placement period. Furthermore, crèche obligations only apply to larger establishments, meaning mothers in smaller workplaces would be left with no support if maternity leave were denied.

Q4. What is the "Wollstonecraft dilemma" mentioned in the judgment regarding paternity leave?

The "Wollstonecraft dilemma" refers to the struggle between achieving gender equality and recognizing the specific needs of mothers. The Court noted that if only mothers are granted leave, it reinforces the stereotype that care work is exclusively a female responsibility. By advocating for statutory paternity leave, the Court aims to encourage a more equitable distribution of caregiving, ensuring that social security laws evolve to support modern, shared parenting roles.