UGC Regulations Vice Chancellor Appointment: Supreme Court on PTU Act Conflict and Validity of Selection

Case Summary

• Case: Dr. S. Mohan v. The Secretary to the Chancellor, Puducherry Technological University & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 54–55 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 4593–4594 of 2024)Date of Judgment: 30 January 2026Bench: Honourable Justice Vikram Nath; Honourable Justice Sandeep Mehta (opinion authored by Honourable Justice Sandeep Mehta)Counsel: Shri Nidhesh Gupta (senior counsel for the appellant); counsel for respondents and UGC appearing (names not all recorded in summary)

• Statutes / Provisions:

  • Puducherry Technological University Act, 2019 — Section 14(5) (composition of Search-cum-Selection Committee)

  • University Grants Commission Regulations on Minimum Qualifications (UGC Regulations), 2018 — Regulation 7.3

  • University Grants Commission Act, 1956 — Sections 14 and 26(1)(e) & (g)

  • Constitution of India — Article 136, Article 142, Article 246 read with Seventh Schedule, Article 254, Entry 25 List III, Entry 66 List I

• Significant cited authorities:Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. v. National Textile Corporation; Dr. Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P.; Praneeth K. v. UGC; Gambhirdhan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat; Rajiv Sarin v. State of Uttarakhand; R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore; Modern Dental College v. State of M.P.; T.N. Medical Officers’ Association v. Union of India; Gujarat University v. Krishna R. Mudholkar; University of Delhi v. Raj Singh; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar.

Introduction — Central Standards vs Territorial Legislation

The Supreme Court’s decision in Dr. S. Mohan (2026 INSC 100) engages the recurring and technically delicate interface between Central standards for higher education and a territorial statute enacted by a Union Territory. At its core the case raises: (i) the legal status of UGC Regulations (2018) framed under Entry 66, List I; (ii) the permissible ambit of a Union Territory legislature under Entry 25, List III; (iii) repugnancy and the role (if any) of Presidential assent; and (iv) appropriate remedies where a university appointment is shown to diverge from mandatory regulatory norms but the appointee is otherwise untainted.

Factual Matrix in Short

The Puducherry Legislative Assembly enacted the Puducherry Technological University Act, 2019 (PTU Act). Section 14(5) prescribed the composition of the Search-cum-Selection Committee for appointment of the first Vice-Chancellor. The committee as constituted did not include a nominee of the Chairman, UGC, and included the Secretary (Higher & Technical Education), Government of Puducherry, for the first appointment. Two writ petitions in Madras High Court challenged the composition and the appointment. The High Court struck down Section 14(5) as inconsistent with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, quashed the appointment but allowed the incumbent to continue temporarily; the Supreme Court heard special leave and affirmed the High Court’s legal conclusions while invoking Article 142 to permit the incumbent to finish his tenure or until a lawful replacement is appointed.

Legal Issues and the Court’s Resolution

Status of UGC Regulations

The Court re-affirmed that the UGC Regulations, 2018 are statutory in character — they derive force from the UGC Act (Sections 14 and 26) and are laid before Parliament — and therefore embody standards traceable to Entry 66, List I. The consequence is important: where the Central enactment occupies the field of coordination and determination of standards for higher education, territorial legislatures must conform.

Legislative Competence and Repugnancy

The judgment incisively reiterates the constitutional distribution of powers. Entry 25, List III permits States/UTs to legislate on education subject to Entries 63–66 of List I. Where a Central law under Entry 66 occupies the field of standards, a State/UT law that conflicts with those standards is invalid. The Court invoked Hoechst and Dr. Preeti Srivastava to explain that Article 254’s repugnancy machinery is engaged in particular circumstances — but, critically, where Parliament has legislated under List I to occupy the standard-setting field, the State/UT attempt to legislate contrary to those standards fails for want of competence. The Court therefore did not need to dwell on the technicalities of Presidential assent under Article 254(2) in this case.

Composition of Search Committee and Conflict of Interest

Regulation 7.3(ii) requires that members of a Search Committee are persons of eminence and not “connected in any manner with the University”. The Court found the PTU Act’s proviso permitting the Secretary (Higher & Technical Education) to be a member created a connection and potential conflict. It further held the omission of a UGC nominee to be fatal because that omission undermined the statutory standards.

Remedy — Cure Versus Stigma

Perhaps the most practically significant aspect is the remedial approach. The Court affirmed the High Court’s declaration of invalidity but, using Article 142, permitted the incumbent to continue until the end of his tenure (or until a fresh selection in conformity with UGC Regulations is made), and allowed him to participate in such selection. The Court emphasised that there was no attack on the incumbent’s integrity or merit. As the Court observed: “the appellant was found meritorious and was duly selected” and abrupt removal would occasion “grave stigma” and administrative disruption.

Critical Observations and Practical Implications

• The judgment reinforces the statutory character and overriding effect of UGC Regulations when framed under the UGC Act and linked to Entry 66. Universities and legislatures (including UTs) must ensure compliance when structuring selection processes for senior academic offices.

• The Court’s refusal to treat Presidential assent as a talisman in the present context is instructive: where the Central enactment has occupied the field under List I, the conflict is disposed of on competence grounds rather than repugnancy technicalities.

• The use of Article 142 to avoid a stigmatic removal is consistent with the Court’s remedial equity-based approach where no mala fides or incompetence is shown. The balancing exercise — vindicating regulatory standards while avoiding undue disruption and stigma — will be relevant in analogous future challenges.

Guidance for Practitioners and University Administrators

• Ensure statutory instruments and selection rules expressly comply with UGC Regulations; include the UGC Chairman’s nominee in the Search Committee where Regulation 7.3 applies.

• Avoid appointing persons who are ‘connected’ to the university to selection committees; do a conflict-of-interest audit before framing selection statutes.

• When litigating, distinguish between procedural irregularity and candidate disqualification: the remedy may differ markedly. Courts may validate a selection process but nevertheless protect an incumbent if the individual is meritorious and no mala fides exist.

Meaningful Quotes from the Judgment

• “The State cannot, while controlling education in the State, impinge on standards in institutions for higher education.”

• “The inclusion of a UGC nominee being an integral component of the standards prescribed for appointments in higher education, any deviation therefrom strikes at the root of the scheme envisaged under the Regulations.”

• “We… direct that the appellant shall continue to hold the post of Vice-Chancellor till the end of his normal tenure or till a new Vice-Chancellor is selected in accordance with law, whichever is earlier.”

Key Passages

“We have heard and considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the impugned judgment and the statutory provisions and the other material placed on record.

The case of the writ petitioners before the High Court was that, although the procedure prescribed under the PTU Act for constituting the Search-cum-Selection Committee for appointment of the Vice-Chancellor of the University may have been followed but the same was not in accordance with the UGC Regulations, 2018. The relevant extracts from the discussion made by the High Court for declaring Section 14(5) of the PTU Act ultra vires on the ground of being inconsistent with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018 and thereby quashing and setting aside the appointment of the appellant are as below:

A plain reading of the aforesaid extract shows that the High Court held that both the Union as well as the States possess the power to legislate on subject of education, however, the State’s competence to regulate on matters relating to education, including medical and university education, is restricted to the fields not occupied by the Union legislation. Furthermore, the State cannot, while exercising control over education within its jurisdiction, impinge upon the standards prescribed for institutions of higher education, which remain exclusively within the competence of the Union.

On that anvil, the PTU Act was required to operate in strict conformity with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, which lays down a mandatory framework for appointment of a Vice-Chancellor and, inter alia, stipulates that the Search-cum-Selection Committee must necessarily include one nominee of the Chairman, UGC. The inclusion of a UGC nominee being an integral component of the standards prescribed for appointments in higher education, any deviation therefrom strikes at the root of the scheme envisaged under the Regulations.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the Search-cum-Selection Committee was constituted without the inclusion of the nominee of the Chairman, UGC, in clear disregard of Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018. Consequently, Section 14(5) of the PTU Act, to the extent it prescribes a composition of the Search-cum-Selection Committee contrary to the mandate of the UGC Regulations, 2018, has to be declared ultra vires the UGC Regulations, 2018, which have been framed under a Central enactment traceable to Entry 66 of List I, which occupies the field and therefore, possess overriding effect.

The aforesaid deviations from the mandatory requirements of the UGC Regulations, 2018 not only vitiate the constitution of the Search-cum-Selection Committee but also strike at the statutory framework governing appointments to the office of Vice-Chancellor, thereby rendering such appointments legally vulnerable.”

Concluding Note

For Counsel advising universities, the message is plain: compliance with UGC-framed standards is not optional where those standards flow from Parliament’s competence under Entry 66. For litigators, the case is a reminder that courts will weigh institutional disruption and individual stigma when crafting remedies — and that Article 142 remains an instrument to fashion equitable outcomes where legal invalidity collides with practical considerations.