WBSEDCL v Adhunik Power: Supreme Court Clarifies Change in Law Compensation in PPA
- Chintan Shah

- 52m
- 7 min read
Case Summary
Case name: West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource Ltd. & Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 2584–2585 of 2026)
Supreme Court Citation: 2026 INSC 202
Date of Judgment: 27 February 2026
Bench: Honourable Justice (Chief Justice) Surya Kant; Honourable Justice B.V. Nagarathna; Honourable Justice Joymalya Bagchi (author)
Advocates: Mr Kapil Sibal, Senior Counsel for appellant (WBSEDCL); Mr C.A. Sundaram, Senior Counsel for Respondent No.1 (APNRL)
Relevant Acts / Statutes: Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015; Coal Mines (Special Provision) Ordinance, 2014; Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1957 (CMN Act); Mines & Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act); Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (sections cited: S.91, S.92, S.94, S.95)
Contractual Instruments: Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) between APNRL and PTC India Ltd. dated 25.03.2011; Power Supply Agreement (PSA) between WBSEDCL and PTC India Ltd. dated 05.01.2011
Key Clauses: Article 2.2 (payment structure); Article 2.5 (deeming of coal sourced from alternate sources as captive and indemnity against separate escalation); Article 10 (Change in Law definition and remedy)
Orders in the litigation: CERC order dated 29.01.2020; APTEL (Appellate Tribunal for Electricity) order dated 04.09.2025 (impugned); CERC consequential order dated 11.02.2026
Cited Judgments and Decisions: Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 516; Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pty. Ltd. v. MMTC Ltd., (2021) 3 SCC 308; GMR Kamalanga Energy Ltd. v. CERC & Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine Aptel 151
Introduction
The Supreme Court’s decision in West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource Ltd. resolves an increasingly familiar contractual conundrum arising in long term power purchase arrangements: the interplay between an indemnity style clause protecting the purchaser against fuel cost escalation when the seller sources coal from alternate supplies (Article 2.5), and a conventional Change in Law clause (Article 10) that permits compensation where statutory or judicial developments alter the legal basis upon which parties contracted. For practitioners advising on PPAs, the judgment is a timely reminder of the importance of contextual contract interpretation, precise allocation of risk, and the proper temporal scope for compensation under change in law remedies.
Facts and Core Issues
APNRL had executed a PPA and PSA arrangement entitling it to supply 100 MW to WBSEDCL. The parties’ negotiations and contemporaneous correspondence indicated that APNRL’s anticipated source of coal was the Ganeshpur captive coal block held in joint venture with Tata Steel. The captive block was not operationalised in time, and APNRL met the shortfall through tapering linkage from CCL and by procuring coal via e auction and imports. Following this Court’s decision in Manohar Lal Sharma on 25.08.2014, the allotment of Ganeshpur was cancelled. The Government then enacted the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015. APNRL sought pass through of additional fuel costs and invoked Change in Law relief.
Contract Interpretation and Surrounding Circumstances
A central holding of the Supreme Court is that Article 2.5 must be read in the factual matrix in which the PPA and PSA were negotiated and executed. The Court accepted the concurrent factual findings of CERC and APTEL that the captive source referred to in Article 2.5 was, on the available materials, the Ganeshpur block. The judgment stresses the settled principle that while written contracts generally speak for themselves, surrounding circumstances may be admitted to interpret terms which would otherwise be ambiguous or unworkable. The Court illustrated this principle by citing Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pty. Ltd. v. MMTC Ltd.
Risk Allocation: Indemnity Clause vs Change in Law
The judgment draws a careful line between two different risk regimes in the same contract. Article 2.5 operates to protect the procurer, WBSEDCL, against price escalation arising purely from the seller sourcing coal from alternate suppliers while the captive source exists but is delayed. By contrast, Article 10 comes into operation where a Change in Law event such as statutory reform, judicial reinterpretation, or fresh regulatory impositions removes or materially curtails the seller’s legal entitlement to the captive resource. In that situation the seller is entitled to be economically restored.
On the facts, the Court held that the judicial cancellation in Manohar Lal, and the subsequent statutory framework introduced by the 2014 Ordinance and 2015 Act, amounted to Change in Law events within Article 10.1.1(b) and (f). APNRL was therefore entitled to compensation for the additional cost it incurred to source coal after the cancellation. The Tribunal’s award of compensation from 25.08.2014 with carrying costs until payment was upheld.
Temporal Limits on Compensation
Notwithstanding the endorsement of APTEL’s Change in Law analysis, the Supreme Court limited APTEL’s grant of relief in a significant respect. APTEL had allowed pass through of all coal procured via e auction or imports to meet tapering linkage shortfalls even before the 25.08.2014 cancellation. The Supreme Court disagreed.
Given the parties’ contemporaneous understanding and assurances that the Ganeshpur block had been allotted and would be operational by supply commencement, Article 2.5’s indemnity shielded WBSEDCL from cost escalation arising solely from pre cancellation operational delay, unless such delay was attributable to a Change in Law. The Court therefore set aside that portion of APTEL’s order while preserving the Change in Law remedy from the date of the cancellation.
Practical Implications for PPA Drafting
This judgment delivers practical lessons for drafters and litigators:
Identify and specify fuel sources in long term PPAs. An express contractual identification of the captive source would avoid costly disputes over contextual evidence and the operation of indemnities.
Distinguish at the drafting stage between indemnities for operational delay, which represent commercial risk, and compensatable Change in Law events, which represent legal risk. Make the trigger dates and mechanisms for relief explicit.
If relying on contemporaneous negotiations or minutes, preserve those documents and ensure they are signed or otherwise acknowledged by contracting parties. Courts may treat them as part of the factual matrix.
For purchasers, a broadly worded indemnity clause like Article 2.5 can effectively limit exposure. For sellers, robust Change in Law provisions should clearly provide for restoration where a legal or regulatory act eliminates the seller’s intended source.
Key Quotable Passages
There is no escape from the irresistible conclusion that the captive coal block refers to the Ganeshpur Coal Block at Jharkhand.
Article 2.5 and Article 10 operate in different fields. While Article 2.5 indemnifies WBSEDCL against escalation in coal price beyond the levelized price, Article 10 is triggered when a Change in Law event materially affects the right of APNRL to operate the coal block and meet its obligation under the PPA and PSA.
These succinct formulations capture the core analytical pivot of the judgment: context driven interpretation calibrating contractual risk allocation.
Conclusion
The decision is an authoritative restatement of two complementary themes: the willingness of courts to bring contextual materials to bear on contractual meaning where the text is shown to be functionally linked to existing facts, and the necessity to segregate commercial risk and legal risk in contract drafting so that remedial expectations following unforeseeable regulatory or judicial developments are clear.
For Indian PPA practitioners and regulators, the judgment should prompt renewed focus on precise allocation of fuel risk and clear change in law mechanics, together with litigation preparedness to establish the factual matrix where necessary.
Extract from the Judgment
The contention advanced by Mr. Sibal, namely that the PPA and PSA did not expressly stipulate the source of coal i.e. Ganeshpur Captive Coal Block, stands squarely rebutted by the concurrent findings of both CERC and APTEL. Reading Article 2.5 in conjunction with the Minutes of Meeting dated 03.01.2011 and the subsequent letter dated 30.04.2012, APTEL affirmed CERC’s finding that PPA and PSA were executed in the backdrop of the minutes drawn on 03.01.2011 wherein one of the salient features of the transaction was as follows:
APRNL has a captive coal block at Ganeshpur in Jharkhand and this coal block is a joint venture with TISCO.
APTEL also noted that immediately after the execution of the PPA and PSA, WBSEDCL vide letter dated 30.04.2012 had enquired about the status of work related to lifting of coal from the coalmine and transportation of coal from the Ganeshpur coal block allocated to APNRL. We consider it apposite to extract herein the contents of the said letter:
Dear Sir,A PPA has been executed on 05.01.2011 by and between WBSEDCL and PTC India Ltd. As per undertaking of APNRL, it is understood that they have already obtained allocation of Ganeshpur Coal Block in the State of Jharkhand for captive mining of coal block jointly with Tata Steel Limited, on equal sharing, i.e. 50:50 basis.
In this context, I would request you to provide us the present status of the work related to lifting of coal from the coalmine and transportation of coal from captive mine, allocated to APNRL, to the coal handling plant, within 10.05.2012.
When Article 2.5 of PPA and PSA is read in light of these correspondences between the parties, there is no escape from the irresistible conclusion that the captive coal block refers to the Ganeshpur Coal Block at Jharkhand.
Mr. Sibal’s argument that a written contract between parties cannot be qualified with reference to any prior or subsequent statements or conduct is unfounded. The law in this regard is crystal clear. Ordinarily, when a contract is reduced to writing, its terms must be determined from the document itself. However, this rule does not put an embargo on looking into such facts which establish a link between terms of the contract and existing facts, or impart meaning to a term which may otherwise be meaningless or unworkable.
These principles have been eloquently summarized in Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pty. Limited v. MMTC Limited wherein this Court observed: Section 92 of the Evidence Act refers to the terms of a contract, grant or other disposition of property or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document. In all these cases, under Proviso (6) read with Illustration (f), any fact may be proven which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts.



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