Ocular Testimony Can Sustain Conviction Without Forensic Corroboration, Rules Supreme Court

Case Summary 

Case Name: Jamnalal v. State of Rajasthan & Anr.  

Date of Judgment: 6 August 2025  

Court: Supreme Court of India – Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction  

Coram: Hon’ble Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Hon’ble Justice K.V. Viswanathan  

Advocates: 

• For Appellant: Mr. K.L. Janjani 

• For Respondent No.1 (State of Rajasthan): Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Additional Advocate General 

• For Respondent No.2: Mr. Namit Saxena  

Acts & Sections Involved: 

• Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – Section 3/4(2), Section 29, Section 30, Section 42 

• Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 376(3) 

• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 164, Section 389 

• Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Section 94 

• Arms Act – Sections 3/25 

• Other IPC sections referenced in antecedents list: Sections 341, 323, 325, 379, 380, 394, 411, 457, 120B, 147, 302  

Cited Judgments: 

• Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary & Anr. (2023) 6 SCC 123 

• Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2014) 16 SCC 508 

• Vijay Kumar v. Narendra & Ors. (2002) 9 SCC 364 

Analytical Commentary 

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Jamnalal v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. underscores the strict standards that appellate courts must observe when exercising powers under Section 389 CrPC to suspend a sentence. The decision sets aside the Rajasthan High Court’s order granting bail to a convict in a heinous offence under the POCSO Act, holding that the High Court had failed to consider the relevant statutory parameters and material evidence. 

At the heart of the Court’s reasoning lies a firm reminder: 

The ocular evidence could not be ignored merely because the FSL report was awaited.

This single line encapsulates the tension between evidentiary completeness and the gravity of conviction in sexual offences against children. 

Background of the Case 

The appellant, father of the prosecutrix, challenged the High Court’s order suspending the sentence of Respondent No.2, convicted by the Special POCSO Court, Karauli, for offences under Section 3/4(2) of the POCSO Act and Section 376(3) IPC. The sentence — 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment — was based primarily on the testimony of the 14-year-old prosecutrix, corroborated by parental evidence and documentary proof of age. 

The Trial Court invoked the statutory presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, observing that the non-availability of forensic reports did not detract from the weight of the victim’s testimony. 

The High Court’s Approach 

The High Court suspended the sentence citing, inter alia, the absence of signs of sexual assault, lack of FSL/DNA reports, and improbability of the prosecutrix leaving the house for defecation despite available washrooms. It concluded that the appellant had “strong grounds” to challenge the conviction. 

However, the Supreme Court found these reasons inadequate and conjectural. Hon’ble Justice K.V. Viswanathan noted that bail post-conviction is governed by a different standard from pre-trial bail, as the presumption of innocence stands erased once a competent court establishes guilt. 

Statutory and Jurisprudential Framework 

Section 389 CrPC provides discretion to suspend a sentence during the pendency of appeal. Yet, as observed in Omprakash Sahni, the exercise of this power must be anchored in a prima facie finding of palpable error in the conviction, not a re-appreciation of evidence or speculative reasoning. 

The Court reiterated that: 

What is to be looked into is something palpable… the appellate court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of Section 389 CrPC and try to pick up a few lacunae here or there in the prosecution case.

This aligns with the earlier dictum in Vijay Kumar v. Narendra, where the Court insisted on weighing the gravity of the offence, nature of accusation, and manner of commission before granting bail in serious cases. 

Relevance of Criminal Antecedents 

The State recorded eleven prior FIRs against Respondent No.2, five of which resulted in acquittals and six pending trial. While the Supreme Court acknowledged that prior acquittals could not, per se, establish guilt, the antecedents were relevant to assessing the High Court’s exercise of discretion in suspending a sentence for a heinous offence. 

Medical and Forensic Evidence 

One of the High Court’s main grounds — the lack of corroborative medical evidence — was undermined by the prosecution’s post-trial receipt of an FSL report showing the presence of male DNA/semen of the accused on the victim’s underwear and private parts. The Supreme Court refrained from pronouncing on its merits but stressed that even without the report, the Trial Court’s reliance on consistent ocular testimony was sound in law. 

This reflects a broader principle in sexual offence jurisprudence: medical evidence is corroborative, not determinative. The testimony of the prosecutrix, if credible, can sustain conviction. 

Key Legal Takeaways 

1. Higher Threshold Post-Conviction: Once convicted, an accused is not entitled to the same presumptive benefit of innocence, and suspension of sentence demands compelling, palpable grounds. 

2. Ocular Testimony Retains Primacy: In sexual offences, credible testimony of the victim can suffice for conviction even in the absence of medical corroboration. 

3. Judicial Restraint in Section 389 Applications: Appellate courts must avoid delving into a reappreciation of evidence under the guise of sentence suspension. 

4. Antecedents as a Relevant Factor: A history of criminal allegations, even if partly resulting in acquittals, can inform the court’s assessment of whether to suspend a sentence in grave offences. 

Conclusion 

The Supreme Court’s decision restores the rigour expected in applications for suspension of sentence, particularly in cases under the POCSO Act. By directing the respondent to surrender, the Court reaffirmed that discretionary relief post-conviction cannot be predicated on speculative reasoning or conjecture. 

The judgment will serve as a strong precedent reinforcing that in heinous offences, particularly involving child victims, the evidentiary weight of the victim’s consistent testimony cannot be diminished by procedural or forensic delays.