De-licensing of Land Use: Supreme Court on Urban Planning Powers and NGT Jurisdiction
- Chintan Shah

- 20h
- 5 min read
Case Summary
Case name: Raj Singh Gehlot & Ors. v. Amitabha Sen & Ors. (Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No(s). 11480/2020 & connected matters)
Date of judgment: 20 January 2026
Bench: Honourable Justice Mehta (authored); Honourable Justice J. B. Pardiwala; Honourable Justice Sandeep Mehta
Lead advocates for appellants: Shri Abhishek Manu Singhvi; Shri Mukul Rohatgi; Solicitor General Shri Tushar Mehta (for DTCP); Shri Pinaki Misra (for Ambience Developers)
Lead advocates for respondents: Ms Uttara Babbar; Ms Kamini Jaiswal; Ms Kanika Agnihotri
Principal statutes and provisions considered
Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (1975 Act):Sections 3(2), 8, and (post facto) Section 3(3A) (2020 Amendment)
Haryana Development & Regulation of Urban Areas Rules, 1976:Form LC-I; Rule 3(1); Rule 4
Haryana Apartment Ownership Act, 1983:Sections 2, 3, 6(1), 6(2), 13 and 24-A
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010:Sections 2(1)(m) and 14
General Clauses Act, 1897
Indian Penal Code, 1860:Sections 120B and 420
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:Section 173(2)
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986
Notable cited authorities
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 161;State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471;Uddar Gagan Properties Ltd. v. Sant Singh (2016) 11 SCC 378;Kerala State Coastal Zone Management Authority v. State of Kerala (Maradu) (2019) 7 SCC 248;Rameshwar v. State of Haryana (2018) 6 SCC 215;Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana (AIR 1988 SC 534);Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody (2025) 4 SCC 150;State of M.P. v. Centre for Environment Protection Research & Development (2020) 9 SCC 781
Overview
This judgment is of practical importance for practitioners who handle urban-planning disputes, writ petitions, environmental claims before the National Green Tribunal and related criminal enquiries.
At its core, the decision addresses three interlocking problems:
The proper scope and limits of a town-planning authority’s power to change land use (the contested practice described as “de-licensing”);
The standard for entertaining relief in public law where disputed questions of fact and long delay are present; and
The demarcation between the jurisdiction of civil courts or administrative authorities and the National Green Tribunal when environmental harm is alleged.
The Supreme Court’s decision carefully balances competing considerations. While the High Court had found systemic irregularities in the original licensing exercise and characterised the de-licensing and re-licensing as a “colourable exercise of power”, the Supreme Court emphasised procedural propriety, separation of fora, and the need to avoid pre-judging issues pending administrative reconsideration and ongoing criminal process.
Key Legal Takeaways
Burden of proof and pleadings in writ proceedings
The Court reiterated the settled principle that a writ petitioner must plead and place clear material in support of allegations of statutory non-compliance or fraud. Applying the approach in Bharat Singh, the Court emphasised that writ petitions decided on affidavits require cogent material and evidence in support of asserted facts. The Court was critical of the High Court’s acceptance of conjecture in the absence of foundational pleadings.
Admissibility of relief where disputed facts predominate
The bench underlined that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and should not be used to resolve heavily disputed factual controversies better suited to trial or detailed administrative enquiry. Delay and laches were accorded weight, particularly as the flats and commercial complex had existed for many years and prolonged silence undermined the claim to extraordinary relief.
“De-licensing” and legislative validation
The Court accepted the State’s contention that the power to grant licences carries, by implication, ancillary powers to modify, rescind or accept surrender of licences, supported by reference to the General Clauses Act.
Crucially, the legislature subsequently inserted Section 3(3A) into the 1975 Act by the 2020 Amendment to expressly recognise the power to “de-licence” and validate past action. The presence of this statutory validation, which was not challenged in these proceedings, influenced the Court’s overall disposition.
Interface with environmental jurisdiction (NGT)
The Court adopted a restrictive view of the NGT’s remit where the dispute essentially turned on contested land-use and statutory licensing issues already before the High Court or administrative authorities. Relying on Auroville and other authorities, the Court held that the NGT should proceed only where a substantial question relating to environment under Section 2(1)(m) arises from an enactment in Schedule I.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court stayed the operational effect of the Joint Expert Committee’s report and kept the NGT proceedings in abeyance until disposal of the pending writ.
Third-party rights and finality concerns
The judgment recognises that third-party purchasers may have acquired proprietary rights in good faith. The Court was sensitive to the disruptive consequences of quashing long-standing permissions without a clear and immediate basis. This concern underpinned the rejection of the High Court’s demolition direction and its direction for immediate registration of a CBI FIR.
Notable Judicial Language
The judgment employs pointed formulations likely to be cited in future litigation, including:
“Fraud vitiates all actions”
“De-licensing is a misnomer”
“A writ petitioner must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition”
These expressions reiterate the twin themes of evidentiary discipline and institutional comity.
Practical Implications for Practitioners
Pleading strategy: Allegations against builders or officials require detailed documentary matrices in the writ itself, including layout plans, correspondence, RTI responses and site reports. Bare assertions will not suffice.
Choice of forum: Where environmental harm overlaps with zoning and licensing disputes, careful assessment is required as to whether the NGT is the appropriate forum under Sections 14 and 2(1)(m), or whether writ and administrative channels should first conclude.
Ancillary remedies: Anticipate legislative validation arguments and be prepared to litigate retrospective effect in appropriate proceedings rather than by collateral attack.
Conclusion
The judgment represents a pragmatic exercise in judicial restraint. It rejects the High Court’s fact-intensive remedial approach while clarifying that its observations do not foreclose pending administrative or criminal processes.
For city-planning and environmental litigators, the decision reinforces three lessons: clear pleadings and contemporaneous evidence are indispensable; institutional boundaries must be respected; and legislative and prosecutorial developments can materially alter remedial possibilities.
In the Court's Words
“A comparison of the prescribed format in LC-1 and the application submitted by the builder purportedly in Form LC-1 shows that he omitted clause (v) from the application which provides for submission of a layout plan of the colony on a scale of 1 centimetre to 10 metre showing the existing and proposed means of access to the colony…
It is inconceivable that concerned authorities failed to notice the stark omissions, interpolations and tampering with the basic document required for purpose of initiation of a project…
We are constrained to draw a conclusion that the possibility of builder acting in collusion with the authorities and duping innocent buyers of apartments cannot be ruled out….”



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