Supreme Court Permits Reopening of Death Sentence under Manoj Safeguards

On 25–26 August 2025, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court allowed an Article 32 writ petition by Vasanta Sampat Dupare convicted for the 2008 rape and murder of a four-year-old and directed that his sentencing be re-examined because the mandatory procedural safeguards laid down in Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2022) were not followed.

The Court expressly held:

The writ petition is allowed. Therefore, we hold that Article 32 of the Constitution empowers this Court in cases related to capital punishment to reopen the sentencing stage where the accused has been condemned to the death penalty without ensuring that the guidelines mandated in Manoj were followed.

This is a consequential development for death penalty jurisprudence in India. By treating Article 32 as a corrective route to enforce procedural safeguards in capital sentencing, the Court has opened a narrowly defined avenue to challenge finalized death sentences where there is credible evidence of procedural deprivation.

The judgment engages three interlocking themes:

1. The Manoj safeguards themselves,

2. The scope of Article 32 as a supervisory instrument in finalised capital cases, and

3. The practical consequences for criminal defenders, prosecutors and prison authorities.

What Manoj requires — and why it matters

The Manoj line of authority imposed a structured, documentary approach to capital sentencing. Trial courts were directed to ensure that sentencing is not an ad hoc exercise: the record must include a contemporaneous dossier setting out mitigating material such as the convict’s jail conduct, psychiatric and psychological evaluations, socio-economic and educational background, antecedents and any evidence of reformability.

The object was procedural rigor — to replace impressionistic assessments with verifiable data that the court can meaningfully weigh before selecting the extreme penalty.

Empirically, compliance with Manoj has been uneven. Commentators and empirical studies have repeatedly shown low rates of meaningful mitigation reporting at the trial stage, prompting the Court to devise remedial mechanisms.

The Dupare order treats Manoj not as a set of aspirational directives but as mandatory safeguards whose non-observance can nullify the finality of a death sentence in exceptional cases.

Article 32 as a corrective conduit — the Court’s reasoning

The Court reasoned that Article 32 — the “constitutional remedy” clause empowering the Supreme Court to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights — remains available where a death sentence has not yet been carried out and there is a plausible claim that the sentencing process violated Articles 14 and 21 (equality and life/ due process).

The order stressed that Article 32’s remedial scope is not unbounded: reopening will be an “extraordinary” relief, confined to cases where procedural breaches are clear and material to the sentencing outcome.

Two features of the Court’s approach deserve emphasis:

• First, the remedy addresses only the sentencing stage and does not relitigate conviction unless the conviction itself is challenged on separate grounds.

• Second, the Court tied Article 32 relief to institutional obligations — not to a convict’s tactical omissions. Manoj places the evidentiary burden of compiling mitigation primarily on the State and the trial machinery; where those institutional duties have been neglected, the Court will entertain Article 32 relief to prevent irreparable constitutional harm.

Limits, safeguards and judicial prudence

The Court was careful to limit the remedy’s scope. Reopening a death sentence is weighty and the Court underscored that Article 32 relief “will remain an extraordinary measure.”

The order signals judicial caution: courts will not entertain opportunistic petitions that seek to relitigate facts or delay execution for tactical gains. Instead, the remedy targets systemic procedural defects that undermine the fairness of the sentencing process.

The decision also situates itself within the long arc of Indian death-penalty jurisprudence — most notably Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (the “rarest of rare” doctrine) — by reaffirming that capital punishment is constitutionally tolerable only where both doctrinal thresholds and procedural safeguards are respected. The Manoj framework operationalises part of that procedural side of the equation.

Broader jurisprudential and policy implications

• Finality vs. fairness. The ruling recalibrates the balance in narrow circumstances: finality yields where fairness has been compromised in respect of mandatory safeguards.

• Institutional accountability. By treating the State’s failure to compile mitigation as a constitutional defect, the Court incentivises systemic reform — better court practices, institutionalised psychiatric assessment capability and standardized jail conduct reporting.

• Litigation load and selective use. Expect a measured uptick in Article 32 petitions in capital cases asserting procedural lapses; courts will triage these strictly to avoid clogging the system or producing delay incentives.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision to allow Dupare to seek reopening of his sentencing under Manoj marks a pragmatic, rights-centred correction to capital sentencing practice. It does not displace the “rarest of rare” principle; rather, it demands that the decision to impose death be the product of a record-based, institutionally sourced inquiry into mitigation.