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AICTE Career Advancement Scheme Regulations and State Recruitment: Supreme Court Clarifies Limits

Case Summary

  • Case Name: Gujarat Public Service Commission v Gnaneshwary Dushyantkumar Shah & Ors.

  • Citation: 2026 INSC 70; Civil Appeal (C) No. of 2026 (@ SLP (C) No. 27710 of 2025)

  • Date of Judgment: 19 January 2026

  • Bench: Honourable Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha; Honourable Justice Alok Aradhe

  • Advocates: Not specified in the provided summary

  • Statutes / Rules Referred:All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 (AICTE Act) — Section 23(1); Section 10(i) and (v);All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme for the Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions) (Degree) Regulations, 2012 (AICTE Regulations);Government Engineering Colleges Recruitment Rules, 2012 (State Rules);General Guidelines to advertisement (Clauses 15(7), 15(8), 15(9) and Clause 16(1))

  • Cited Authorities: Anupal Singh & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 173

  • Orders under challenge:Single Judge order dated 25 November 2024 (writ dismissed);Division Bench order dated 20 August 2025 (Letters Patent Appeal allowed)


Introduction

This judgment resolves a focused but recurrent question in the intersection of administrative law, higher education regulation and federal competence: whether AICTE’s 2012 Career Advancement Scheme Regulations can be invoked to govern initial, open competitive recruitments for Professor posts conducted by a State Public Service Commission under State recruitment rules.

In Gujarat Public Service Commission v Gnaneshwary Dushyantkumar Shah & Ors., the Supreme Court, through Honourable Justice Alok Aradhe (with Honourable Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha concurring), emphatically answers in the negative and restores the recruitment conducted by the Gujarat Public Service Commission in 2015.

Factual and Procedural Backdrop

An advertisement dated 23 September 2015 invited applications for seven Professor posts in Government Engineering Colleges in Gujarat; one post was for Professor (Plastic Engineering). The State Rules and the advertisement prescribed interview-based assessment and minimum marks for female unreserved candidates (45/100).

The candidate (respondent No. 1) secured 28 marks in the interview and was not recommended. She thereafter challenged the selection process in writ proceedings by invoking the AICTE Regulations (2012), contending that those Regulations governed even direct recruitment and therefore the interview-based selection was inconsistent with AICTE-prescribed assessment norms.

The Single Judge dismissed her writ. The Division Bench allowed the Letters Patent Appeal, held that AICTE Regulations applied, and directed reconstitution of the selection in accordance with AICTE norms. The Commission’s appeal to the Supreme Court followed.

Core Legal Issues

Two principal legal themes thread through the judgment:

1. Scope and Purpose of the AICTE Regulations (2012)

Are those Regulations recruitment rules intended to govern initial appointment to Professor posts in State-run engineering colleges? The Court undertook a purposive construction, situated within the AICTE Act’s architecture (Section 23(1) empowering the AICTE to frame regulations not inconsistent with the Act; Section 10 functions) and the text of the Regulations themselves.

2. Waiver, Estoppel and Challengeability of Selection Procedures

Whether a candidate who participated in an explicitly advertised interview-based process without prior objection can be permitted to impugn the process after an adverse result.

Ratio Decidendi and Reasoning

The Court’s analysis rests on textual and purposive grounds. Two passages capture its thrust:

“The Regulations are not Recruitment Rules but are Promotion and Progression Rules.”
“To apply AICTE Regulations to a candidate participating in recruitment for the post of Professors … would be to stretch the AICTE Regulations beyond its text, context, and purpose.”

The Court emphasised that the AICTE Regulations (CAS 2012) operate upon incumbents or newly appointed Assistant or Associate Professors. They presuppose a service profile, PBAS/API scores accumulated in service, and a process of career progression. The AICTE scheme is therefore a ladder for career advancement, not a gate for initial entry.

The use of terms such as “direct recruitment” in the AICTE Regulations is read in the limited context of internal ladder-entry, not open-market competitive recruitments conducted under State Rules.

Federalism, Competence and Recruitment Autonomy

On federalism and competence, the Court noted that although AICTE lays down national norms for technical education, the Act does not empower AICTE to supersede State recruitment rules for initial appointments in government colleges.

The Court therefore rejected the Division Bench’s finding that AICTE Regulations overrode the State Rules in this context.

Estoppel and Finality in Selection Processes

On estoppel, the Court applied the settled principle that a candidate who participates in a selection process without protest ordinarily cannot challenge the rules or the method of selection after an adverse outcome. The Division Bench’s failure to apply this principle constituted an error.

The Court reiterated that:

“Courts do not make appointments.”

It stressed the impropriety of reopening a recruitment concluded in 2015 on the basis of a regulatory regime which never applied.

Key Implications for Practice and Policy

1. Recruitment vs Promotion Regimes

This judgment underscores the need to distinguish carefully between regulations governing in-service career progression and those governing initial recruitment.

2. Importance of Pre-emptive Challenge

Candidates desirous of challenging advertisement terms or selection methodology must do so before participation, as post-result challenges invite estoppel.

3. Central Norms and State Recruitment Rules

The judgment does not diminish AICTE’s normative authority but circumscribes the reach of a specific regulatory instrument so as not to unsettle State recruitment schemes.

4. Administrative Clarity

State governments and public service commissions should clearly specify applicable standards and legal bases in recruitment rules and advertisements to avoid litigation.

Selected Notable Observations

  • “The law does not permit a regulation crafted as a ladder to be used as a gate.”

  • “A recruitment concluded in 2015 cannot be reopened in 2025, on the basis of the Regulations that never applied to it.”

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision provides doctrinal clarity on the limits of AICTE’s CAS Regulations and reinforces established principles of estoppel in selection litigation. For practitioners, the ruling highlights the importance of precise statutory pleading and timely challenge. For policymakers, it invites clearer drafting and harmonisation where uniform standards are intended to apply across recruitment and career progression.

Reasoned Observations

The Regulation’s architecture demonstrates that the AICTE scheme is directed towards those who are already members of the academic system. Section 23(1) of the Act empowers the AICTE to frame Regulations:

“not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and generally to carry out the purposes of the Act.”

Coupled with Section 10, which mandates the Council to lay down norms and standards for courses, curricula, physical and instructional facilities, staff pattern and staff qualifications, the regulatory power is robust but bounded.

The Regulations framed on 08.11.2012 set out stages of promotion under the Career Advancement Scheme and presuppose incumbency, service record and PBAS/API scores. Regulation 3.9 contemplates appointment and designation as Professor for those who complete requisite stages and credit points. The process depends on assessment by a selection committee:

“as suggested for the direct recruitment of Professor,”

but is not identical with open competitive recruitment.

The Court noted that the Tables in Appendix-I, including Table-II(c), are contextual to the Career Advancement Scheme. They prescribe minimum Academic Performance Index scores meaningful only where an institutional service history exists.

The Division Bench’s expansive reading would have conflated internal promotion mechanisms with external recruitment exercises, an interpretative stretch the Court declined to endorse.

Moreover, fairness and finality in public recruitment demand that an applicant who voluntarily participates in an explicitly defined process cannot later invoke a different regulatory regime after non-selection. The principle of estoppel prevents such litigational afterthoughts.

While the candidate possessed noteworthy research credentials and publications, judicial review does not operate as an avenue for courts to effect appointments on merits. In this case, the absence of a pre-participation challenge, the clear terms of the advertisement and the limited scope of the AICTE Regulations justified upholding the recruitment carried out by the Gujarat Public Service Commission.

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